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On May 20, 2005, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) 
held the second session of its 2005 “Congressional Seminar Series” on key issues 
concerning the U.S.-Russian security relationship.  The session highlighted opportunities 
and obstacles to addressing biological threat reduction. 
 
Summary of remarks by Anne Harrington, Director of the National Academy of 
Sciences’ Committee on International Security and Arms Control: 
 
Ms. Harrington addressed the risk of biological proliferation in Russia and Eurasia.  She 
outlined five sources of risk for biological proliferation: expertise, facilities, materials, 
unstable sociopolitical environments, and the proximity of the region to the Middle East.  
Regarding expertise, the thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians involved in 
bioresearch and development possess skills that could contribute to biological weapons 
programs.  Dozens of research, production and design facilities still remain throughout 
the former Soviet Union, posing a proliferation risk.  Information on the extent and 
location of biological materials remains sparse, even within the Russian government.  
Dangerous pathogen collections exist at many of these sites.  Efforts have been made to 
locate these materials and to take initial actions to safeguard them in order to prevent 
illicit transfer.  The unstable sociopolitical and economic environment in the region, 
exemplified by the current unrest in Uzbekistan, pose a danger to the security of 
biological institutes and materials.  Finally, the facilities’ proximity to the Middle East 
make them particularly tempting targets for biological materials theft by terrorist groups.  
Several unsuccessful incidents of nuclear materials transfer have been discovered, and 
biological materials could follow the same trafficking networks. 
 
The U.S. has been engaged with key bioinstitutes in the region since 1994, and expanded 
that involvement in 1997.  Several U.S. government agencies oversee programs focused 
on responding to the biological proliferation threat including the Departments of State, 






Protection Agency.  In 2001, the White House review of biothreat reduction programs 
encouraged the expansion of these programs.  Internationally, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and the European Union are all funding projects and activities related to 
reducing the biological threat.  In particular, Canada has made a major contribution under 
the G-8 Global Partnership.  Among non-governmental organizations, the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative and the Civilian Research and Development Foundation have implemented 
projects and encouraged dialogue that has sensitized policymakers and the public to the 
importance of the biological threat.  In addition, the International Science and 
Technology Center now devotes 40% of their budget to funding biological institutes and 
research. On the Russian side, increased attention to the problem has resulted in 
competitive grant programs for bioresearchers in order to absorb their expertise and 
discourage proliferation.   
 
Ms. Harrington stressed that biological proliferation remains a risk.  Biological 
researchers have not been sufficiently redirected to alternative careers.  The Russian 
government plans to reduce the overall number of Russian science research facilities 
from 2,600 to 1,600 by 2010.  The scientists with biotechnology expertise from these 
disbanded facilities will need to be re-employed in peaceful civilian research.  The State 
Department’s Bio-Industry Initiative is a model for how it has engaged bioresearch and 
production facilities and has made progress in ensuring their sustainability.  However, 
inadequate progress has been made on securing biological materials. 
 
However, Ms. Harrington insisted that real progress has been made in reducing the 
biological threat.  Access to and transparency of bioinstitutes in Russia and the former 
Soviet Union have increased in recent years.  Also, a small but developing private biotech 
industry has emerged in Russia with the capacity to absorb some expertise.  Certifications 
and standards for biological research have been increasing.  Linkages to other institutes 
and the business sector has strengthened the viability of the Russian biotech industry.   
 
Ms. Harrington outlined a series of challenges facing biological threat reduction efforts.  
The first is money.  Currently, biological threat reduction programs are not funded in a 
way that promotes their long-term success.  A project-by-project funding approach will 
not provide for long-term stability.  Individuals are also needed to champion biological 
threat reduction policy within the Russian and American governments.  Traditional views 
of cooperative threat reduction primarily as a program to secure nuclear material have 
constrained innovation and capacity building in the biological field.  There is a need to 
coordinate and complement US and G-8 Global Partnership efforts in the biological field.  
More flexibility is needed in implementing agreements between outsiders and Russia.  A 
new threat assessment regarding biological weapons is needed that is not constrained by 
Cold War thinking.  Finally, several programs have had extraordinarily successful access 






is needed is consideration of how to expand this success into more difficult situations 
such as North Korea. 
 
Summary of remarks by Dr. Gerald Epstein, Senior Fellow for Science and Security at 
the Center for Strategic and International Security: 
 
Over the past several years, an evolution has taken place in the consideration of the 
biological threat.  Once seen as a state-based threat perpetrated by militaries, non-state 
actors are increasingly showing their ability to use biological materials to advance their 
goals. 
 
Dr. Epstein’s Biological Threat Reduction project at CSIS is examining a range of efforts 
needed to properly address this treat, including dissuasion, denial of access to capabilities 
and materials, and defending against and responding to bio attacks.  The project also 
looks at other nations’ efforts in combating the biological threat.  Actors who have not 
traditionally focused on international security are now being asked to prepare to defend 
against biological attacks.  The public health, law enforcement, and scientific 
communities are all becoming involved.  They can provide new mechanisms to defend 
against the biological threat that have not been readily available in the confines of the 
diplomatic and military communities.  Furthermore, international cooperation among all 
these actors is essential, because the problem of biodefense and biosecurity is 
international. 
 
Several mechanisms, both formal and informal, exist to combat the biological threat.  
Established international institutions such as the World Health Organization and treaties 
comprise the formal structure of the biological nonproliferation regime.  Other collective 
actions, in the form of resolutions and funding, have also bolstered the regime.  United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires UN member states to deal 
with non-state threats within their jurisdiction, and increased international 
nonproliferation funding to the former Soviet Union are two examples.  While 
international action against the biological threat is important, improving domestic 
capacity and ability to act in countries around the world will encourage a proactive 
outlook that will be more effective in combating the threat than simple reaction. 
 
The motivations for nations to combat the biological threat remain diverse due to the lack 
of consensus as to the nature of the threat.  A wide range of opinions exists on the 
seriousness and form of the threat and the immediacy with which it needs to be 
combated.  This lack of agreement stems from the gap between the absence of past 
biological attacks, on the one hand, and the known ability, particularly as technology 
continues to evolve, to produce biological weapons that could generate very serious 






than others due to the perception that it is more likely to be attacked than another country.  
International cooperation is difficult to achieve when the seriousness of the threat cannot 
be agreed upon. 
 
Several barriers inherent in the threat impede effective responses.  The biological threat 
represents both a security and a public health problem.  This combination means that  
although both the security and public health communities will play an essential role in 
responding to a biological attack, both communities must recognize that in some ways, a 
deliberately induced epidemic is unlike anything that either community is used to dealing 
with.  While some of their problem-solving skills will remain necessary, both may have 
to abandon some of the assumptions they bring from their respective fields and approach 
the threat as new.  For example, the culture of secrecy present in the security community 
may hamper cooperation with other domestic and international actors. 
 
Cooperation in countering bioterrorism can also be stymied by the dual-use nature of 
biological technology and facilities, particularly in the realm of biodefense -- activities 
undertaken by a state in order to counter the threat may be seen by others as actually 
contributing to the threat.  Finally, many developing countries face a trade off between 
biological security and public health problems in deciding where to allocate scarce 
resources.  When insufficient public health resources are available to deal with endemic 
health threats such as HIV and malaria, it will be difficult to convince officials that they 
should devote some of these to preparing for possible smallpox or anthrax attacks in the 
future.  
 
Measures must be taken at every stage of dissuading, impeding, countering, or 
responding to a biological attack.  No single measure, by itself, is likely to be very robust, 
making it important to layer on as many impediments to the malicious use of biology as 
possible.  The Biological Weapons Convention, for example, codifies an important norm 
against the possession of biological weapons. Efforts at dissuasion could also be 
improved by making more biological weapons activities criminal acts and giving law 
enforcement authorities greater power to intervene.  For example, until recently, law 
enforcement authorities in the United States had to prove intent to use a biological agent 
as a weapon in order to conduct an investigation or bring a prosecution.  The mere 
possession of biological agents– even ones that had been developed as weapons in the 
past, such as anthrax -- was not illegal.  Also, Interpol’s increased interest in bioterrorism 
and global law enforcement will help strengthen international cooperation in combating 
the threat.  UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which obligates states to criminalize 
biological weapon-related activities short of actual use, calls for increased export controls 
on biological materials and technology as well.  As biotechnology advances and its dual-
use properties increase, however, export controls will become less effective.  Finally, 






security-based environment.  However, with the intellectual freedom that is essential to 
the conduct of world-class science, biological research that could potentially be 
misapplied can become part of the public domain, available to be exploited by anyone. 
 
Intelligence funding and sharing are also becoming important tools to combat the 
biological threat.  Epidemiological surveillance can be used to pinpoint outbreaks of 
infectious disease.  The World Health Organization unfortunately has little resources to 
conduct such surveillance and must rely on countries to make voluntary contributions to 
support its outbreak investigations.  Also, the WHO’s public health mission, and its need 
to gain access to nations where disease outbreaks have occurred, require it to maintain a 
strict perception of neutrality that it believes would be threatened were it to work too 
closely with the law enforcement or security communities. 
 
Foreign repositories of pathogens with sloppy control procedures present a proliferation 
risk for biological material.  While increased security for these facilities is needed, it 
remains difficult for developing countries to adequately fund and implement these 
security upgrades. The screening of personnel with access to biological agents presents 
another security problem.  Stronger international standards should be adopted in verifying 
the background of potential employees.  However, it will be difficult to internationalize 
requirements that, like those in the United States, prohibit citizens of certain countries 
from gaining access to certain biological agents.  Countries are not likely to agree on 
which other countries’ citizens should be prohibited from access. 
 
The response capacity of different international agencies and organizations should be 
constantly evaluated and improved.  The Global Health Security Action Group, 
consisting of the G-7 countries plus Mexico, and national Ministries of Health have all 
conducted drills to test their ability to respond to biological crises.  Nongovernmental 
entities have also conducted such simulations; for example, an international exercise 
called Atlantic Storm, conducted in January 2005, simulated a wave of smallpox attacks 
against civilians in several different countries and tested the ability of political leaders to 
allocate scare resources such as smallpox vaccine.   
 
Finally, although international collaboration on countermeasures to the biological threat 
remains essential, states’ wish to protect national biological industries – and therefore to 
seek to retain R&D or procurement investments within their borders, and possibly to limit 
sharing of information or technology – may pose some barriers. 
 
Summary of remarks by Elisa D. Harris, Senior Research Scholar at the Center for 







Ms. Harris discussed the impact of advances in biotechnology on security, including the 
need to manage the risks from “dual-use” research --  i.e., research that can be used for 
both peaceful and destructive purposes. 
 
Several incidents in recent years have stimulated concern about the potential misuse of  
biotechnology, either as a consequence of legitimate research or because of deliberate 
malfeasance.  In January 2001, researchers in Australia published the results of an 
experiment in which mice were injected with a genetically modified mousepox virus as 
part of an effort to develop a contraceptive for controlling the mouse population.   
However, this variant of mousepox turned out to be highly lethal, even for mice that were 
previously vaccinated against the disease.  In September 2001, the anthrax letter attacks 
against Congress and American journalists further highlighted the risks from biological 
agents that had been optimized for destructive effects.  These and other events have 
caused a surge of concern about bioterrorism and increased worry that terrorists would 
use advances in the life sciences to create new biological agents to use in attacks. 
 
Ms. Harris then reviewed three major developments in recent years designed to respond 
to this threat:  the Fink Committee report, President Bush’s Biosecurity Initiative, and the 
expansion of research efforts for bioterrorism and biodefense.   
 
In October 2003, the Fink Committee of the National Academy of Sciences issued a 
report entitled “Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism.”  The Committee’s 
report was important in a number of respects.  First, it clearly articulated the threat, 
stating unequivocally that biotechnology research is dual-use and could cause disruption 
or harm, potentially on a catastrophic scale.  It also outlined a number of thoughtful 
recommendations for beginning to address this problem.  One was to expand the National 
Institute of Health’s guidelines for recombinant DNA research to include seven types of 
“experiments of concern,” and to require a review of the biosecurity risks of such 
experiments before they are conducted.  A second major recommendation of the 
committee was the establishment of a National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense to 
help develop and oversee implementation of these new guidelines. 
 
In March 2004, the Bush administration responded to the Fink Committee’s report with 
its own Biosecurity Initiative, the centerpiece of which was the creation of the National 
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity.  According to its charter, this new advisory 
body will be responsible for developing guidelines for local and national oversight of 
dual-use research; developing a code of conduct for scientists and laboratory workers; 
developing education and training programs on biosecurity issues; developing guidelines 
for the dissemination of research results; and fostering the extension of the US measures 
to the international arena.   Unfortunately, although it has been more than a year since the 






not be for another six weeks, at the end of June.  Thus, while the Bush Biosecurity 
Initiative represents a start, the U.S. government clearly needs make the dual-use issue a 
higher priority.   
 
Finally, there has been a significant expansion in recent years of research efforts in 
bioterrorism and biodefense.  For example, the bioterrorism budget of the National 
Institutes of Health has increased 3200% , from $53 million in fiscal year 2001 to over 
$1.8 billion (requested) in fiscal year 2006.  Much of this money is being directed to  
biodefense research.  NIH is also funding a 20 fold increase in BL-4 laboratory space, 
nine new regional biocontainment labs with BL-2 and BL-3 capabilities, and eight new 
regional centers of excellence for biodefense and emerging infectious disease research.  
Thousands of researchers are taking advantage of these funding opportunities to begin to 
work on dangerous pathogens, including over 11,000 researchers that have been 
approved to work with so-called select agents.  A National Biodefense Analysis and 
Countermeasures Center is also being established at Ft. Detrick which, among other 
things, will do biological agent research that falls squarely in the areas the Fink 
Committee identified as “of concern,” including work on susceptibility to therapeutics, 
environmental stability, aerosol dynamics and host-range studies.    
 
In the end, however, the proposals developed by both the Fink Committee and by the 
Bush administration will not result in adequate oversight either over this expanded 
bioterrorism research effort or over the activities of other researchers whose work could 
be misused for destructive purposes.  First, both fail to include key parts of the life 
sciences research community as well as industry.  Second, neither involve binding, 
enforceable obligations. Finally, neither properly address the international dimension of 
the dual-use problem, focusing instead on the domestic situation.  
 
The strategy proposed by the Center for International and Security Studies at the 
University of Maryland, by comparison, is comprehensive, mandatory, and global in 
scope.  The oversight approach envisioned would involve a case-by-case review of 
certain types of research projects before they are undertaken to assess any potential 
security implications.  The proposal would also require the licensing of researchers and 
institutions engaged in potentially dangerous research.  These obligations would apply to 
all relevant institutions, whether government, industry or academic.  They would be 
binding.  And they would be harmonized internationally, so that researchers beyond the 
United States follow similar procedures and rules.   
 
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the need for enhanced oversight of dual-use 
research has become an imperative.  While Ms. Harris remains concerned about the 
possibility of a bioterroist attack against the United States, she stressed the danger of 






as from the dramatic increase in work with dangerous pathogens in the context of 
bioterrorism prevention.  While the Fink Committee and the Bush Biosecurity Initiative 
are useful first steps in reducing the biological threat, they do not go far enough.  A 
system of oversight for dual-use research needs to be put in place that would apply to all 
relevant research institutions, would be mandatory, and would be global in scope.            
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